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Abstract
We explore the implications of migrants￿self-selection for the determination of
immigration policy in a simple model where incentives and resources to migrate vary
with skills. We show how self-selection determines the response of potential migrants
to immigration policy changes, which is crucial for predicting the e⁄ects of such
policy in the receiving country. For example, restricting immigration when it is low
skilled may worsen self-selection and thus the receiving country skill distribution.
These selection e⁄ects may lead low skilled natives to support a more restrictive
policy even though current immigrants are not harmful for them, and the receiving
country government to impose signi￿cant restrictions even in a purely utilitarian
world.
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As it is well known, those who decide to migrate are not a random sample of their home
country population. Incentives to migrate, and ability to pay for it, vary with skills.
Besides, receiving countries￿immigration restrictions signi￿cantly in￿ uence bene￿ts and
costs of migration, and thereby migrants￿skill composition. Understanding migrants￿
self-selection becomes then crucial for the formation of the receiving countries￿policies,
since self-selection determines how di⁄erent potential migrants respond to immigration
policy changes.
In this paper, we build a simple framework to analyze the interaction between self-
selection into migration and the determination of immigration policy. While it is com-
monly understood that various e⁄ects of migration, both in sending and receiving coun-
tries, vary signi￿cantly with immigrants￿characteristics1, the relation between immigra-
tion policy and immigrant "quality" remains largely unexplored.
In particular, we consider three facets. First, what drives the decision to migrate,
i.e. which conditions are likely to lead to high vs. low skilled migration. Second, how
receiving countries￿policies a⁄ect this decision, i.e. what is the relation between immigra-
tion restrictions and immigrants￿skill composition. Last, what are the implications for
receiving countries, i.e. how immigrants￿self-selection determines the impact of a policy,
its political support and ultimately its "optimality".
More speci￿cally, we model migration in a world with two countries. The sending
country has an heterogeneous population of individuals (called "foreigners"), who decide
whether to go and work in the receiving country. Foreigners di⁄er in terms of skills and
wealth, hence each of them faces di⁄erent incentives to migrate and di⁄erent resources
to pay for it. The receiving country has an heterogeneous population of workers (called
"natives") and a standard labor market where immigrants compete with similarly skilled
natives and complement those with di⁄erent skills. Natives support a policy that max-
imizes their equilibrium wages: high skilled aim at increasing the supply of low skilled
immigrants, low skilled push for the opposite. These preferences are then aggregated by
the receiving country government, which sets immigration restrictions according to the
weight attached to di⁄erent groups in the population.
In our model, immigrants￿self-selection is driven both by their incentives and wealth
constraints. The ￿rst term looks at wage di⁄erentials (net of migration costs) and tells
that migrants are likely to be high skilled if returns from migration increase with skills.
The second term points out that, since migration is a costly investment and credit market
are typically imperfect, one has to be su¢ ciently wealthy to a⁄ord it. Given that wealth
and skill are in general positively correlated, this constraint tends to generate high skilled
migration.
1Restricting our attention to the economics literature, see Borjas (1994), Friedberg and Hunt (1995),
Chiswick, Lee and Miller (2005) on the labor market e⁄ects, and Storesletten (2000), Lee and Miller
(2000) on the e⁄ects on public ￿nance.
1Immigration restrictions increase the costs migrants have to pay to enter and work
in the receiving country. Given self-selection, i.e. given that incentives and resources
to migrate di⁄er across foreigners, the policy in￿ uences immigrants￿skill composition
(Q). Higher costs, due to a wealth e⁄ect, allow only richer and more skilled foreigners
to migrate, hence increasing Q. At the same time, due to an incentive e⁄ect, they have
stronger deterrence on those with lower gains from migration, hence increasing Q if and
only if returns to skills are higher at destination.
In other words, we show how the policy has an (indirect) screening power, due to the
fact that its marginal e⁄ect is stronger on the poorest or least motivated. Notice however
that these two groups need not coincide: high skilled are generally the ones with highest
ability to pay, while if returns to skills are higher in the sending country, low skilled
have the highest gain from migration and thus the highest willingness to pay. Thus, the
relation between immigration restrictions and migrants￿skill composition is in general
shaped by both terms. In particular, we show that given that these e⁄ects may have
opposite directions, and that their strength varies with the level of costs, this relation
need not be monotone. If migration incentives increase with skills, it is always positive.
Otherwise it may be U-shaped, with the incentive e⁄ect dominating at low levels of cost
and the wealth e⁄ect taking over afterwards.
Irrespective of its shape, self-selection is generally crucial also for understanding the
e⁄ect of a given policy in the receiving country. Here, the impact of immigration depends
on the resulting changes in the receiving country skill composition R, that is the ratio
of high to low skilled workers (natives and immigrants). By shaping migration ￿ ows,
immigration restrictions in￿ uence R, and their e⁄ect can be decomposed into a size and
a quality component. According to the former, ￿ ows are reduced while assuming that
their quality is ￿xed, and the concern is on immigrants￿skill composition as compared
to natives. Obviously, if immigrants are less skilled than natives, admitting less of them
increases R. For the quality component, instead, what matters is how immigrants￿compo-
sition respond to di⁄erent policies and, as explained above, this depends on self-selection.
We show that, as the skill compositions in receiving and sending countries get similar,
the two components may push the total e⁄ect in opposite directions. Hence, encouraging
immigration when it is high skilled, or equivalently restricting it when low skilled, may
decrease its quality. Moreover, the quality component dominates when the least repre-
sented group of migrants is, in absolute terms, the most sensitive to a policy change. For
this to be the case, migration costs has to be su¢ ciently small. Hence, given that the
strength of quality and size e⁄ects depends on the level of cost, also the relation between
immigration policy and R may be non-monotone.
As an example, suppose that returns to skills are higher at destination and the two
countries have similar skill compositions, so that immigrants are positively self-selected
and on average more skilled than natives. Now, Q increases everywhere with immigration
costs, while R may follow an inverted-U. At low levels of cost, the quality e⁄ect tends to
2be stronger: increasing the cost increases R by improving migrant quality. After some
point, however, the size component takes over: at high migration costs, basically no low
skilled foreigner migrates, hence further restrictions just lower the size of high skilled
migration, thus reducing R.
These e⁄ects, which are driven by immigrants￿self-selection, turn out to have impor-
tant implications for the receiving country, both with respect to natives￿attitudes and to
the government￿ s optimal policy. First, the relation between natives￿skills and support for
a given policy may appear counterintuitive. When the quality component is stronger, we
may observe a group of natives supporting more (respectively less) restrictive policy even
though current immigrants complement (respectively compete with) them. For example,
low skilled natives may oppose immigration even if current immigrants are not competing
with them, since further restrictions would increase immigrants￿average skills, the receiv-
ing country skill ratio and hence low skilled wages. Here it is self-selection, rather than
immigrants skill composition per se, that drives the e⁄ect of immigration policy and thus
the relation between natives￿skills and immigration attitudes.
Second, the government￿ s program has now to account for immigrants self-selection.
As in standard models, we show that, ￿xing immigrant quality, free immigration is the
most e¢ cient policy (the one maximizing total surplus in the receiving country), and
immigration restrictions may be a way to protect those who lose from migration. In
our setting, however, restrictions to immigration are imposed even in a world with no
distributional concerns and no political economy distortions, in order to maximize (or
minimize) immigrants￿quality. In fact, when the quality e⁄ect matters, migration costs
may be a way to optimally screen the most desirable type of migration.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the
model and discusses its main assumptions. Section 3 analyzes the model, highlighting its
logic and main results in comparison with other approaches and some empirical evidence.
We then elaborate on some central elements of the analysis: returns to skills and labor
market discrimination (Section 4.1); migration costs, networks e⁄ects and time consuming
bureaucracies (Section 4.2); immigration policy preferences, ￿scal policy and political
economy concerns (Section 4.3). Section 5 concludes by drawing some policy implications.
Before that, however, we brie￿ y confront with the existing literature.
1.1 Related literature
The present model lies in the interaction between three streams of literature, dealing with
immigrants self-selection, the determinants of immigration preferences and immigration
policy formation.
The basic theory of economic migration as human capital investment goes back to
Sjaastad (1962). Studies following this approach typically assume that the rate of return
to migration increases in skills, hence they predict (and estimate) positive self-selection
(see Chiswick (1978) and Chiswick (1999)). A number of other models put forward rea-
3sons to question this result. The most in￿ uential work is probably by Borjas (1987),
who adapts the Roy￿ s model to international migration. He emphasizes the role of the
dispersion in returns to skills while abstracting from migration costs as an important
determinant of self-selection. Arguing that wage inequality is in general higher in devel-
oping country, studies on this line typically predict (and estimate) negative self-selection.2
However, some of the most recent empirical literature stands in contradiction with Borjas
(1987), as it documents positive self-selection even when returns to skills are higher in the
sending country (see e.g. Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), Akee (2005), Br￿cker and Defoort
(2006)). Our model tries to reconcile these ￿ndings by providing a general treatment of
the determinants of self-selection. In addition to the role of returns to skills, we focus on
the interaction between two elements highly overlooked in the formal literature. First, we
introduce wealth constraints and credit market imperfections, which have been typically
ignored in classical studies of self-selection into migration.3 Second, and more impor-
tantly, we stress the role of immigration policies, while the literature generally considers
only the supply side.4 A common assumption seems in fact that immigration restrictions,
by selecting from a given pool of applicants, act on top of the migration decision, and
independently from it. The paper shows that, by considering demand and supply sides in
isolation, one may draw erroneous conclusions both on self-selection and on the e⁄ect of
immigration policy in the receiving country.
The demand side has traditionally received less attention.5 Only recently, some papers
have systematically investigated the determinants of individual preferences towards im-
migration. This literature ￿nds a consistent pattern: in developed countries, there exists
a strong positive correlation between individual education and "pro-immigration" atti-
tudes. Nonetheless, there is no consensus on what is actually driving this relation. While
basically nobody denies that di⁄erent forces may be at play, some studies focus on factors
2Other interesting approaches challenging positive self-selection can be found in Katz and Stark (1987)
on asymmetric information on immigrants productivity and the possible occurrence of lemon market
e⁄ects or in Stark and Taylor (1991) where immigration is driven by poor performance relative to some
reference group. In these models the "worst" are those who leave.
3Hatton and Williamson (2004) state: "When dealing with selection, the immigration literature tends
to stress income incentive [...But] changes in selection can be best explained by changes in the costs of
the move and the capital constraints on it". These constraints play a leading role in the theory of illegal
migration in Friebel and Guriev (2004), that has however a pretty di⁄erent focus than our one. The most
similar formalization of the migration decision is presented in Lopez and Schi⁄ (1998), who highlight the
interaction between heterogeneous labor force, migration costs and ￿nancing constraints in a modi￿ed
Hecksher-Ohlin model. However they focus on the e⁄ect of trade liberalization in the sending country
under the assumption that high skilled migration is driven only by incentives while low skilled migration
only by wealth constraints.
4The only exception is, to my knowledge, Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2005). Assuming that immi-
grants are positively self-selected, they argue in favor of an high immigration quota. By reducing wages
in the receiving country, it increases immigrant quality and maximize national income.
5For example Borjas (1994) states that "the literature does not yet provide a systematic analysis of
the factors that generate the host country￿ s demand function".
4like racism, anxiety, social and political alienation and other cultural values and beliefs
(e.g. Espenshade and Hempstead (1996), Citrin, Green, Muste and Wong (1997), Hain-
mueller and Hiscox (2004)), while others emphasize economic motivations. In particular,
a number of papers (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2004), O￿ Rourke and Sin-
nott (2004), Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005b)) relate individual skills to immigration
preferences using a standard factor-proportion analysis, where immigrants are assumed
to compete in the labor market with similarly skilled natives and to complement natives
with di⁄erent skills. They explain the positive correlation by observing that immigrants
tend to be less skilled than natives and (implicitly) assuming that skill composition of im-
migrant is ￿xed. We instead keep the quality of immigrants as endogenous, and possibly
dependent on immigration policies, as we are interested precisely in analyzing the e⁄ect
of policy on quality, not only on size, as a determinant of immigration policy preferences.
Hence, our model can also be viewed as a test of robustness of these approaches: in a
sense, we follow the spirit of "rational expectation", where people account for the total
e⁄ect of the proposed policy on equilibrium outcomes, as opposed to assuming "adaptive
expectations", i.e. considering the quality as ￿xed to past levels.
On the formation of policies, one standard approach focuses on the immigration sur-
plus (e.g. Borjas (1995)), implicitly assuming that immigration policies are based solely
on e¢ ciency considerations. On the other hand, immigration policies are generally con-
￿ ictual, hence their determination depends crucially on the political and institutional
factors which "aggregate" citizens￿preferences.6 The issue has attracted a few theoreti-
cal investigations, like Benhabib (1996), who explores how the median voter determines
minimal capital requirements for admission, and Epstein and Nitzan (2005) and Facchini
and Willman (2005), who use a lobbying model to explain the formation of immigration
quotas. Our paper does not develop any new political economy model, but it may add
some novel insights to this literature since individual preferences over policy and immi-
grant quality are fully endogenized and the role of migration cost as a policy variable is
emphasized.7
2 The model
The model has two countries, a sending and a receiving one, and three sets of actors:
workers in the sending country, who decide whether to migrate; workers in the receiving
country, who express their preference over immigration policy; and the receiving country
6See e.g. Goldin (1994), Timmer and Williamson (1998) and Hatton and Williamson (2004) on the
role of interest groups in shaping immigration policy.
7The fact that migration costs can (partly) be a policy variable is recognized also in Clark, Hatton and
Williamson (2002), who assume that lower quotas indirectly imply higher costs for migrants. However
their analysis, similarly to Mayda (2005), is focused on the volume of immigration ￿ ows and does not
address the relation between policy and skills composition of immigrants.
5government, which actually sets immigration policy.
More speci￿cally, the sending country is populated by a mass n￿ of heterogeneous
workers, called "foreigners". Each worker is endowed with skill ￿ 2 fH;Lg and wealth,
conditional on ￿, drawn by a distribution ￿￿ with continuous density !￿: Let n￿
￿ denote
the mass of workers of type ￿; so that n￿ = n￿
H+n￿
L. Depending on their wealth and skills,
foreigners may decide to migrate. Their utility is linear in wages and costs of migration,




￿ if he stays
w￿ ￿ (￿ + "i) if he migrates (1)
where w￿
￿ denotes the (exogenous) wage in the sending country, w￿ the (endogenous) wage
in the receiving country, and ￿ + "i the cost of migrating. The latter includes a common
term ￿, i.e. any out-of-pocket and relocating cost, and an individual speci￿c "psychological
cost" "i; that is a random variable with support on R+ following a distribution ￿, with
continuous density ￿. Immigrants have to incur the cost ￿ up-front, and the sending
country has no credit market for them, thus only su¢ ciently wealthy people can a⁄ord to
migrate.
The receiving country is a small open economy with perfectly mobile capital, a neoclas-
sical production function with constant returns to scale, and a competitive labor market.
In this country too there is a population of workers, here called "natives", who are het-
erogeneous in skills ￿ and have mass n = nH + nL: Apart from supplying labor, natives
express their preferences over immigration policy. In fact, their equilibrium wages depend
on the supply of skills in the country, which is in￿ uenced by immigration. In particular,
wH and wL are functions of NH and NL; where N￿ = n￿ + x￿ is the total number of type
￿ workers and x￿ is the endogenous number of immigrant of type ￿: Hence, by regulating
x￿; immigration policy a⁄ects wages and thus natives￿utility U￿ = w￿:
Finally, the receiving country government sets the immigration policy by maximizing
a weighted welfare function W, where the weight ￿￿ attached to group ￿￿ s utility depends
on the speci￿c institutional setting.8 Immigration policy acts on the monetary cost ￿;





￿HUH(￿) + ￿LUL(￿) (2)




1 if n￿ > n￿￿
0 otherwise
(where n￿￿ is the number of natives of the other type). Also, one may explore the role of lobbying by a
group n￿ in order to increases its in￿ uence ￿￿:
62.1 Assumptions
Some more speci￿c assumptions are now added, in a somewhat crude way. Their in-
terpretation and essentiality are discussed in the next section. First, the idiosyncratic
component of foreigners￿utility "i, is assumed to be independent on type ￿ and to have a










Second, we let high skilled people be on average wealthier than low skilled. In particular,
we assume that the high skilled wealth distribution is more favorable than the low skilled







; for every ￿ 2 R+
Finally, denote the production technology in the receiving country as Y = F(NH;NL)
and F￿ := @F(NH;NL)=@N￿: We require that F￿ decreases in the amount of workers with
skill ￿ and increases in the amount of workers with di⁄erent skills, i.e.
Assumption 3 : FHH;FLL < 0 and FHL > 0
2.2 Discussion of the main ingredients
Before proceeding with the analysis, let us clarify the role of our main assumptions. The
psychological cost "i (Assumption 1) just smoothes the decision process and this allows
a standard marginal analysis. It re￿ ects individual heterogeneity, i.e. the large set of
elements in￿ uencing the decision to migrate which cannot be completely reduced to mon-
etary costs and bene￿ts (e.g. age, family ties, access to networks at origin and destination
country). The term does not drive any of the results, and its broad interpretation can be
justi￿ed to the extent that these elements are not signi￿cantly correlated with the type ￿
(see the discussion in Section 4.2).9
The assumption of log-concavity is a standard monotonicity requirement. Intuitively,
it captures the fact that a lower realization of the cost is associated with an higher
probability of migration, i.e. the less one su⁄ers from moving the more likely he is willing
to do it. In our setting, this implies that the marginal e⁄ect of a change in gains or cost
is higher for those with less incentive to migrate. Formally, log-concavity means that the
9See also the early thoughtful discussion of the relation between education and migration costs in
Schwartz (1973).
7most sensitive to a change in the parameters are not too concentrated in the tails of the
distribution, and the assumption is very mild as a large class of distributions satis￿es it.10
On wealth distribution (Assumption 2), we have again a monotonicity requirement:
the probability of being able to pay the migration cost increases with skill. The positive
correlation between skill and wealth is however a well documented regularity, especially
in developing countries (see for example Filmer and Pritchett (1999) or Piketty (2000)).11
Formally, we require hazard rate dominance, that is slightly stronger than ￿rst order sto-
chastic dominance (￿H(￿) < ￿L(￿) for every ￿), but weaker than the standard assumption
of monotone likelihood ratio.12
The relation between wages and migration deserves some words. First, we think that,
from an individual perspective, the e⁄ect on wages is negligible, and thus it does not in-
￿ uence the decision to migrate. Hence, potential migrants take wages as given. For policy
formation, instead, what matters is the aggregate e⁄ect. We are interested in the receiving
country￿ s policy, hence we can keep wages in the sending country as exogenous.13 In the
receiving country, instead, Assumption 3 requires that immigrants are perfect substitutes
of similarly skilled natives. The evidence on this is pretty controversial. Many studies
(see the reviews in Borjas (1994) and Friedberg and Hunt (1995) or the recent study by
Card (2005)) ￿nd a rather small impact of immigration on natives￿wages, while Borjas
(2003) forcefully documents that immigrants do compete with similarly skilled natives
and signi￿cantly lower their equilibrium wages. Taken literally, our model is consistent
with the latter approach, but notice that what we emphasize is citizens￿belief, rather
than actual e⁄ect, to be of this kind.14 More generally, we are interested in highlighting
the connection between the economic impact of immigration and natives￿preferences.
For this purpose, we derive how the receiving country skills￿ratio changes under di⁄er-
ent immigration policies, keeping the somewhat crude and controversial assumptions on
preferences and labor market outcomes as a clean way to identify the determinants of
immigration policy preferences. One may think of more realistic assumption, but the
10For example one can consider the Uniform, Normal, Lognormal, Weibull, Exponential, Logistic,
Laplace, Gamma, Chi-Squared distributions. Furthermore, we require that log￿ is concave; that is a
weaker than assuming that log’ is concave. For example, the Pareto distribution has logconvex density
but logconcave cumulative distribution function (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)).
11In light of this, the fact that we do not consider the possibility to borrow money in order to migrate
is also pretty innocuous. Even if an (imperfect) credit market was opened, wealthy people would be able
to borrow more or at a lower cost than the poor ones, that is what we need. Obviously, if one assumed
a perfect world, wealth constraints would become irrelevant.
12The importance of the monotonous likelihood ratio property (MLRP) in economics applications was
emphasized for example by Milgrom (1981). A simple proof that MLRP implies hazard rate dominance,
which implies stochastic dominance can be found in Krishna (2002) (Appendix B).
13This needs not to be a realistic assumption: e.g. Mishra (2003) and Hanson (2005) document how
Mexican wages are a⁄ected by emigration.
14This seems evident if one considers the centrality of the issue in past and current policy debates and
the literature on immigration attitudes quoted above.
8logic of our exercise should hold (see Section 4.3).
The policy variable we focus on is ￿, that is the cost foreigners have to incur to
enter and work in the receiving country. A few assumptions are implicit here. First, the
relevant policy space is restricted to ￿: Second, this policy is not systematically related
to immigrants skills. Third, the migration cost ￿ is (partly) endogenous, i.e. it can
be signi￿cantly in￿ uenced by the receiving country policies. The ￿rst two features are
clearly a simpli￿cation. Immigration policies are much more articulated, and to some
extent they are made conditional on immigrant type ￿. Our formalization can be thought
as a starting point to explore the relation between immigration policy and self-selection,
in a world where immigrant type ￿ is not perfectly observable or contractible. Some
complications to this picture can be included as minimal extensions of the basic model,
and they are presented in Section 4.2.
Endogenous migration costs are instead an essential feature of our approach: these
costs are both an argument of the migration decision and a policy variable. Of course
they have also exogenous components (like the distance between the two countries), and
partly exogenous ones (like transportation costs or the existence of an established network
of previous migrants). We argue, however, that policies in the receiving country may play
a signi￿cant role. What immigrants have to pay comprises also direct fees, bureaucracies,
queuing and other time consuming requirements which increase foregone earnings or the
money to be spent with consulting or legal services. These components may become
more and more relevant, given the historical trend of decreasing transportation costs
and increasing immigration restrictions (Hatton and Williamson (Forthcoming)).15 In
addition, policy makers seem well aware of this: historically, the ￿rst interventions to
limit and to select immigration ￿ ows in the US and Canada acted on prices: costs were
increased, removing monetary incentives and introducing lengthy procedures or head taxes
for admission. Quantity restrictions (quotas) came at a later stage.16
Finally, it is already clear that the political economy part of the paper is pretty stripped
down, since for example we do not model where the weights ￿￿ come from. It is not our
15This cost can also be thought as a consequence of uncertainty. The model abstracts from the issue,
but one can interpret the set of people that are su¢ ciently wealthy as those who have su¢ ciently low
risk aversion. The relation between skills and risk aversion however is less clear. If it tends to be positive
(less risk adverse people invest more in human capital), the model may apply.
16Timmer and Williamson (1998) report that the United States, for example, introduced a head tax of
50 cents per migrant in 1882, that was progressively raised to $8 in 1917. Also, in 1907 they introduced
the ￿rst ￿nancial test, establishing that each individual must have $25 (or $50 per family). The same acts
extended the classes of "excludable" immigrants, i.e. those who were prohibited to entry because they
would have surely become a burden for the hosting society. Passenger acts in the US in the 19th century
(￿xing minimal standards to carry immigrants) is another policy that indirectly increased migration costs.
Canada has also acted on costs in order to control the composition of the immigrant population. In 1870,
a travel fund of C$30 per adult (for Mennonites that agreed to build settlements) was introduced, while
in 1910 migration was restricted by a tax of C$50 per head (C$200 per head for Asians). The ￿rst quota
restiction in the United States came in 1921.
9intention, however, to develop a new model on this. Rather, we prefer having a ￿ exible
form and, exploiting the insights of existing models, let these weights vary and look at
what happens to the preferred migration policy, once immigrant quality is considered
endogenous.17
3 Analysis
3.1 The migration decision
It follows directly from (1) that a foreigner i of type ￿ prefers migration i⁄w￿￿(￿+"i) ￿
w￿
￿; and for each type ￿ there exists a cut-o⁄ value "￿ ￿ w￿ ￿ w￿
￿ ￿ ￿ such that any
individual i of type ￿ with "i < "￿ would like to migrate. In addition, this individual must
be su¢ ciently wealthy to incur the migration cost ￿: Thus, the supply of migrants of type
￿ is de￿ned by
x￿ := q￿n
￿





where the fraction ￿[w￿ ￿ w￿
￿ ￿ ￿] represents those who have incentive to move and
[1 ￿ ￿￿(￿)] those who could a⁄ord to move.
Many of the following results depend on how migrants compare to non migrants. This



















While extremely simpli￿ed, this characterization of the individual decision to migrate
allows to address some fundamental debates in the current literature.
3.1.1 Positive or Negative Self-Selection
As noted, many studies document that migrants are not a random sample of the sending
country population. Self-selection can be of course evaluated along many dimensions. We
focus on observable skills (like education), and in this sense we de￿ne positive or negative
self-selection when those who migrate are on average more or less skilled than those who
remain at home, i.e. Q ? 1. In the model, self-selection is driven by constraints, i.e.
di⁄erent ability to incur the migration cost, and incentives, i.e. di⁄erent returns to skills.
17Notice also that the possible revenues from the "entry tax" ￿ do not appear in the welfare function.
This is a simpli￿cation, but probably a minor one. First, the magnitude of these proceeds does not
appear to be substantial, considered also the cost of maintaining a bureaucratic system of enforcement.
More importantly, a signi￿cant part of the money paid for migration need not be public revenues. Take
for example the amounts paid to agencies providing immigration services: these are a direct result of
immigration restrictions, but they are not pocketed by the receiving country government.
10Wealth constraints are less severe for the high skilled (Assumption 2) and thus push
towards positive self-selection:
[1 ￿ ￿H(￿)] > [1 ￿ ￿L(￿)]
Incentives to migrate, instead, are greater for high skilled if the wage di⁄erential in the
receiving country is higher than in the sending one. Denoting these di⁄erentials as ￿w￿ =
w￿
H ￿ w￿
L and ￿w = wH ￿ wL; we can write
￿[(wL ￿ w￿
L) + (￿w ￿ ￿w￿) ￿ ￿]
￿[wL ￿ w￿
L ￿ ￿]
￿ 1 () ￿w ￿ ￿w
￿
If ￿w ￿ ￿w￿ we can clearly conclude that migrants are positively self-selected, while if
￿w < ￿w￿ the total e⁄ect is ambiguous and it depends on the relative strength of the
two forces, i.e. whether the migration decision is driven more from wealth constraints
(likely for relatively poor source countries) or incentives (likely for relatively rich source
countries).
Proposition 1 When wealth constraints are the main determinant of the migration sup-
ply, migrants tend to be positively self-selected. When migration is driven mostly by in-
centives the same holds if and only if ￿w ￿ ￿w￿:
The recent ￿ndings by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005), i.e. Mexican migrants to the US
are positively self-selected despite returns to skills are higher in Mexico, can be interpreted
recognizing the interaction between costs of migration and returns to skills in shaping the
self-selection process. In general, wealth constraints push towards positive self-selection,
and this e⁄ect is greater the poorer the source country is. This matches also the more
aggregate evidence in Hatton and Williamson (2004) and Br￿cker and Defoort (2006),
where the gap in years of schooling between movers and stayers is positive (thus supporting
the view that migrants are positively self-selected); it increases with the distance between
source and destination country and it decreases with source country per capita GDP.
3.1.2 Comparative statics: incentive and wealth e⁄ects
We are now interested in describing how migration size and quality depend on migration
costs and economic conditions in the source country. In Borjas (1987), who focuses
on the role of migration incentives, higher source inequality (being a proxy for higher
returns to skills) is associated with lower quality of migrants. Chiswick (1999), while not
explicitly introducing wealth constraints, emphasizes the role of costs (implicitly assuming
that returns to skills are higher in the receiving countries) and in his model higher costs
increase the quality of migrants. We generalize these results, emphasizing how they
depend crucially on self-selection, and in particular on whether migration is driven by
wealth constraints or incentives.
11Migration cost To see instead the e⁄ect of the migration cost on quality, notice that
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The ￿rst term is always positive and it represents a wealth e⁄ect: increasing the cost one
gets richer and more skilled migrants, and the strength of this term increases with the level
of cost and with wealth inequality. The second term instead is positive i⁄￿w ￿ ￿w￿; and
this describes an incentive e⁄ect: changing costs has a relatively higher impact on people
with lower gain from migration. If ￿w ￿ ￿w￿; low skilled are on average those with less
incentives to migrate, thus an increase in costs has a stronger deterrence on them and
the quality increases. It is clear that when wealth constraints are the main determinant
of the migration supply, migrant quality increases with migration cost, while if migration
is driven mostly by incentives the same occurs if ￿w ￿ ￿w￿: Instead, when ￿w < ￿w￿;
the e⁄ect is ambiguous. For low levels of cost the relation is negative, since the wealth
e⁄ect is weak and incentives dominate. The shape of Q as costs increase depends on the
strength of the two e⁄ects. Roughly, when ￿("H) goes to zero faster than (1￿￿L), Q ! 0
as ￿ increases, since at some point a few high skilled are willing to migrate. When the
opposite occurs, there exists a cost beyond which the wealth e⁄ect takes over, as a few
low skilled are able to migrate, hence the relation becomes non-monotone and Q ! 1
(see ￿gure 1).
Recalling our discussion on Proposition 1, we can sum up saying:
Proposition 2 If ￿w ￿ ￿w￿ migration cost and migrant average skills are positively
correlated. If ￿w < ￿w￿ the relation is ambiguous, being either decreasing everywhere or
non-monotone.
Wealth and wages As the source country becomes wealthier, more people are able to
incur the migration cost, thus we should expect migration to increase. On the other hand
this is often associated with an increase of wages at home, that reduces the incentives to
migrate and thus the migration ￿ ow.18 In fact source countries typically experience an
inverted-U relationship between development and migration (see e.g. Rotte and Vogler
(2000), Hatton and Williamson (2004) and Mayda (2005)): at early stages, higher growth
relaxes wealth constraints and leads to higher migration; at later stages instead it tends
to decrease the incentives and hence to reduce migration.
18This should be clear even if the relation between wealth and income is not explicitly analyzed in our
model (that is intentionally kept a static one).
12Figure 1 Relation between immigration cost and immigrant quality. The top line rapresents the case of
￿w > ￿w￿; the midlle one ￿w < ￿w￿and "strong" wealth e⁄ect, the bottom one ￿w < ￿w￿and
"weak" wealth e⁄ect.






The e⁄ects on quality are similar to those analyzed in the previous point. An increase
in the average wealth in the source country decreases the quality (since now more poor and
low skilled people can a⁄ord to move), while an increase in the level of wages w￿
L increases
Q i⁄ ￿w ￿ ￿w￿ (since as before @Q=@w￿
L > 0 () ￿("L)￿("H) ￿ ￿("H)￿("L) > 0).
Finally, the e⁄ect of source country inequality is ambiguous. More wealth inequality
(i.e. the lower is ￿H with respect to ￿L) increases Q, while more wage inequality (i.e.
higher ￿w￿) decreases Q. Once again, since wealth and wage distributions tend to be
highly correlated, the total e⁄ect on Q depends on whether wealth constraints or incentives
are the major determinant of the migration decision.
3.2 The e⁄ects in the receiving country and natives￿preferences
Immigrants￿self-selection is an interesting variable per se. It is useful for example for
understanding the impact of migration on the source country, or possibly to investigate
issues like assimilation, discrimination, crime, in the receiving country (see e.g. Butcher
and Morrison Piehl (2005)). However, in our model, the key determinant both of immi-
gration policy preferences and of the ensuing government program is the labor market
interaction between natives and immigrants in the receiving country. What matters here
is the skill composition of immigrants as compared to natives, rather than to the source
country population; hence, one has to consider also the pool of foreigners over which
13self-selection takes place, and the pool of natives with whom immigrants compete.
In brief, we are interested in seeing how immigration policy shapes immigrants supply
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where N￿ = n￿+x￿ is the total number of type ￿ workers and x￿ is the supply of immigrant
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where R is the ratio NH=NL of high to low skilled workers, which varies with migration
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Equations (7) and (8) implicitly de￿ne how wages depend on immigration policy. The
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Thus, we can limit our attention to the direct e⁄ect of immigration policy on R: Since
the policy in￿ uences both size and quality of immigration, and these two components
may have opposing directions, the relation is not obvious ex-ante. Suppose for example
immigrants are on average less skilled than natives. A more restrictive policy reduces
immigration and thus ceteris paribus increases the skills ratio R. However, if immigrants
are negatively self-selected, this same policy may also decrease their quality. The total
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As obvious, R is a⁄ected by the skill composition of immigrants vs. natives, i.e. xH=xL
vs. nH=nL. This is simply a size e⁄ect, as described in equation (11): for a given quality
of the migration ￿ ow, increasing the cost increases R if and only if immigrants are less
skilled than natives. At the same time, however, changing the cost changes the pool of
immigrants, as described by equation (12), and analyzed in the previous section. This
represents a quality e⁄ect: higher costs increase the skill ratio R if and only if they improve
immigrants self-selection. Standard discussions about immigration policies consider only
the size e⁄ect. This may be misleading, as these two e⁄ects are not only there, but, as
we now describe, they may have opposite directions.
3.2.1 The tension between the size and the quality e⁄ect
We argue that, in general, both size and quality e⁄ects are to be considered before pre-
dicting the impact of a given policy on R. In fact, there are situations where the tension










As implied by Proposition 2, condition (13) is met for all ￿ when skill compositions are
similar in the two countries (i.e. n￿
H=n￿
L ’ nH=nL) and the relation between Q and ￿
is monotone (i.e. either ￿w ￿ ￿w￿ or the wealth e⁄ect is second-order). Suppose for
example immigrants are positively self-selected and more skilled than natives. In this
case, a less restrictive policy tends to increase R through the e⁄ect in (11) and, as shown
in Proposition 2, to decrease it through the e⁄ect in (12). On the other hand, there are
no tensions for example when immigrants are positively self-selected but still less skilled
than natives, since increasing the cost increases R both because you get less immigrants
and because their self-selection improves.19
We restrict the analysis to situations where (13) holds and try to shed some light on




























H ￿ 0 (14)
First, notice that the quality e⁄ect is less likely to be an issue if the skill compositions of the
two country are very di⁄erent. If say the sending country has a very poor skill composition
19Alternatively, condition (13) holds for all ￿ when Q is monotone and self-selection is very strong, so
that immigrants are more skilled than natives despite being selected from a "bad pool" or they are less
skilled than natives despite coming from a "good pool".
15(n￿
HnL << n￿
LnH), all else equals, a more restrictive policy is likely to increase R (recall
that @q￿=@￿ < 0); as it is likely to have a larger absolute impact on low skilled foreigners,
irrespective of pattern of self-selection.
This e⁄ect being clear, we now abstract from the it and concentrate on the case where
n
￿
H = nH and n
￿
L = nL (15)















qH ￿ 0 (16)
We can now see that, given (13) and (15), a su¢ cient condition for the quality e⁄ect to
prevail is







In fact, given (15), xH ￿ xL is equivalent to xH=xL ￿ nH=nL and condition (13) implies
that qL ￿ @qH=@￿ ￿ qH ￿ @qL=@￿ ￿ 0; which coupled with (17), gives the relation in (16).
Hence, R increases with ￿ despite immigrants being more skilled than natives, i.e. the
quality e⁄ect is stronger than the size e⁄ect. Condition (16) is very intuitive: the size
e⁄ect is by de￿nition random, hence it hits a group of foreigners proportionally to their
propensity to migrate. On the other hand, the quality e⁄ect, as seen in the previous
Section, tends to be stronger on the least represented group. Condition (17) simply
tells that the latter prevails when the least represented group is, in absolute terms, the
most sensitive to a policy change.20;21 Moreover, as long as the ￿ ow of immigrants in the
receiving country is relatively small, i.e. qL and qH are small; the condition is almost
necessary.
In addition, we can state a necessary condition for the quality e⁄ect to prevail:
￿ ￿ ￿
max (18)
where the maximum cost depends on the functional forms ￿ and ￿￿ we assume (see
the Appendix for some examples). Roughly, a low cost is needed to have a su¢ ciently
heterogeneous population of migrants responding to policy changes. If the cost is so high
that there is basically only one group of foreigners which migrates (being them the richest
or the most motivated), then by de￿nition one cannot have any quality e⁄ect. Suppose
20Notice that these derivatives are negative, hence @qH=@￿ ￿ @qL=@￿ is equivalent to j@qH=@￿j ￿
j@qL=@￿j; i.e. it means that low skilled are more sensitive.
21An interesting example of this (which is not a directly considered in the model, though), is when
immigrants are mostly low skilled and illegals. Immigrants depress R but immigration restrictions are
likely to worsen the situation by discouraging high skilled migrants, without a⁄ecting low skilled (illegal)
ones.
16for example migration is driven only by wealth constraints, and the cost is such that only
high skilled can a⁄ord it. Immigrants are more skilled than natives, and Q increases in
￿; hence condition (13) holds. But at this point the quality e⁄ect is very weak: a further
increase in ￿ only prevents high skilled to migrate, hence it decreases R. In other words,
as qL and @qL=@￿ are almost zero, (16) reduces to @qH=@￿ < 0:
The last observation implies that, when the quality e⁄ect matters, the relation between
￿ and R is non-monotone. To see this pattern in the simplest way, assume that migration
is driven only by incentives, and let ￿ have (almost) all mass at ". Consider for example
￿w ￿ ￿w￿, hence the quality e⁄ect tells that increasing the cost increases R as more low
skilled stay at home. But beyond the point wL ￿ w￿
L ￿ " no low skilled foreigner wants
to migrate, hence increasing the cost just discourages high skilled and thus reduce R: In
this case, the relation between ￿ and R follows an inverted-U. Similarly, if ￿w < ￿w￿,
we have a U-shaped relation, with a minimum at ￿ = wH ￿ w￿
H ￿ " (see ￿gure 2):22
In the Appendix, we discuss the conditions for non-monotonicity somewhat more
broadly. For now, we summarize with the following
Proposition 3 Under condition (13), quality and size e⁄ects have opposite directions.
Their strength varies with ￿; and the quality e⁄ect may prevail when ￿ is low and the skill
compositions of the two country are similar. In this case, negative (positive) self-selection
implies a U (inverted-U) relation between R and ￿:
3.2.2 The quality e⁄ect and immigration attitudes
The last proposition implies that, when the quality e⁄ect is at play, the support of a
given policy may be counterintuitive, with some natives pushing for more (respectively
less) restrictive policy even though immigrants are bene￿cial (respectively harmful) for
them. In order to see when (and whether) this may actually be a relevant argument,
suppose migration from poor country is mostly driven by wealth constraints. Those who
move are basically those who can a⁄ord it, hence we have positive self-selection. If the
destination country is rich and have a much higher skill composition, it may be that
immigrants are less skilled than natives even though they are positively self-selected.
In this case, as we have already noticed, increasing the cost bene￿ts low skilled both
because they get less immigration and because immigrants￿average skill increases. Size
and quality e⁄ects go hand in hand, hence they cannot be directly disentangled. However,
if the destination country is also poor, skill compositions may be similar and immigrants
may improve the skill ratio. Here, depending on the strength of selection and of the
quality e⁄ect (i.e. on wealth inequality and the level of cost relative to wealth), you
22A similar pattern can be found if we instead assume that only wealth constraints matter, and that
wealth distribution conditional on type is extremely concentrated at k￿. In this case, we have an inverted-
U, with the maximum at ￿ = kL
17Figure 2 Relation between immigration cost and receiving country skill ratio. The solid line equals
nH=nL, the curves rapresents the case of n￿
H=n￿
L = nH=nL under di⁄erent self-selection patterns (as
in ￿gure 1). The solid curve rapresents the case of second-order quality e⁄ect.








may then observe that high skilled support a less restrictive policy even though current
immigrants are high skilled. In fact, lower costs would reduce immigrants￿quality, the
receiving country skill ratio and thus increase high skilled wages. Similar reasonings may
apply to migration between rich countries. Assume that migration here is driven mainly
by incentives, and that the receiving country have higher returns to skills, so that we have
positively self-selected immigrants who increase the skill ratio. Now, low skilled may want
a more restrictive policy even if current immigrants complement them.23 We can sum up
with the following:
Corollary 1 Considering only the skill composition of immigrants vs. natives may lead
to erroneous predictions of natives￿preferences over immigration policy. For example, low
skilled natives may support a more restrictive policy, even though immigrants increase the
receiving country skill ratio.
A neat empirical test of these hypothesis is admittedly not easy. So far, there is a small
literature on migration in the South and very little is known about immigration preferences
there (see Mayda (2004)). In addition, surveys in the North focus on general attitudes
23The last case to consider would be North-South migration. But here typically only high skilled
migrate (see for example SOPEMI (2004) for high skilled migration from Japan and the US to China).
Hence, in our two-types model, we would have only a size e⁄ect.
18towards immigration. We do not know for example whether these di⁄er according to
immigrants source country, hence possibly to self-selection. The only general fact, i.e.
that support to immigration in the North increases with skills (as described in Section
1.1), is consistent with our model, but it is not a sharp test of it. In fact, the typical
case of South-North migration is that the immigrants are positively self-selected but still
less skilled than natives (see e.g. in Borjas (1995), Hatton and Williamson (2004) and
Chiquiar and Hanson (2005)), hence quality and size e⁄ect have the same direction. On
the other hand, many other dimensions are possibly important in shaping immigration
policy preferences. In Section 4, we further discuss to what extent one could broaden the
analysis without changing the main logic presented here.
3.3 Equilibrium Policy
We have seen that in general the relation between cost and R is not monotone and it
is determined both by self-selection and by the source country￿ s skill composition. This
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We are now interested in seeing how the preferred policy changes by varying our weights
￿￿. First notice that if the government cares about each group of workers (i.e. immigrants
and natives) according to its size, i.e. ￿￿ = N￿; it just maximizes the total output hence,
unsurprisingly, it sets ￿ = 0:
Suppose instead that the government cares only about natives, and the weights again










Notice that the function W is convex and has a minimum at R = nH=nL i.e. when
xH=xL = nH=nL: Thus economic bene￿ts from immigration are minimized when immi-
grants replicate, in terms of skills, the native population. Since the government has no
distributional concerns, it acts on costs in order to admit immigrants that complement
natives and so maximize or minimize the skill ratio. Consider ￿rst the case in which the
decision to migrate is una⁄ected by policy changes, or the di⁄erence in skill distribution
between sending and receiving country is very large, so that immigrant quality can be
kept ￿xed. Now @R=@￿ > 0 () xH=xL < nH=nL and so @W=@￿ < 0. Hence welfare is
maximized when migration costs are zero.24
24The result resembles a well known principle in international trade, where gains from trade are higher
the greater the trading countries di⁄er in their factor endowments. A similar point, in a more complicated
setting, is made by Borjas (1995).
19If the quality e⁄ect becomes relevant, the sign of @R=@￿, and hence the optimal
policy, depends on self-selection and on the characteristics of the sending country. In
general, when ￿￿ = n￿; the optimal policy is the one maximizing R if xH=xL > nH=nL
and the one minimizing R if xH=xL < nH=nL:25 Proposition 3 then implies that also the
relation between natives￿welfare and immigration restrictions is not monotone: in order
to maximize or minimize R, the government optimally imposes a positive immigration
costs. Notice that, given ￿￿ = n￿; the government only cares about natives￿total surplus.
Hence, immigration restrictions are not due to distributional concerns or other departures
from "pure e¢ ciency", but they are rather a way to screen the most "desirable" type of
immigrants by a⁄ecting their self-selection.
Changing the weights ￿￿ typically results in di⁄erent policy predictions. In particular,
a deviation from the above policy can occur if redistribution of the immigration surplus
is costly or imperfect, hence the government may want to moderate the burden on the
loser from immigration rather than maximize the bene￿ts of those who are gaining. Al-
ternatively, it may be the result of a change in the political power of a group of citizens,
as considered below.
3.3.1 What drives policy: a special case
As already mentioned, the most common description of South-North migration is that
immigrants are positively self￿ selected but less skills than natives. Thus, @R=@￿ > 0
and nLxH ￿ nHxL < 0;and the optimal cost is zero or, if ￿w < ￿w￿; the minimal cost
that creates positive self-selection. In any case, the two conditions imply that we are at
the right of the optimal cost. A more restrictive policy thus comes at the expenses of
e¢ ciency and may be driven by distributional concerns towards the low skilled.
To put this in historical perspective, one may argue that during the last century
immigration restrictions have been implemented in most developed countries (partly)
as a result of an increase in ￿L:26 In fact, as shown in standard lobbying models (e.g.
Grossman and Helpman (1994)), the policy bias in favor of a group of voters increases
with their degree of organization in in￿ uential lobbies and with the responsiveness of their
support to policy changes. Low skilled workers have become more powerful (e.g. through
unionization) and less abundant, hence more sensitive to immigration issues (the elasticity
of wL with respect to xL increases in R) and more in￿ uential in the political process.27
25In words, if immigrants are less skilled than natives, the optimal policy is the one preferred by
high skilled natives, and vice versa. The intuition follows directly from the fact that the government is
insensitive to the e⁄ects of the policy on immigrants, hence it maximizes the bene￿t for the group of
workers where the proportion of natives is larger.
26See Timmer and Williamson (1998) for pre World War II policies and Mayda (2004) for more recent
reforms.
27Similarly, in a median voter approach, one may argue that the increasing participation of the working
class in the political process (e.g. extension of the franchise) has decreased the average skill of the median
voter.
20This change may be a major driving force behind immigration restrictions, that are a way
to limit the decline in low skilled wages.28
Proposition 4 When the quality e⁄ect is secondary, total welfare is maximized with zero
migration costs, and policy restrictions may be a way to protect those who lose from
immigration. When the quality e⁄ect is relevant, even absent distributional and political
economy issues, it is optimal for the receiving country to screen immigrants by imposing
positive migration costs.
4 Discussion and extensions
4.1 Returns to Skills
Our formalization of self-selection and of the relation between policy and quality has
emphasized wealth and incentive e⁄ects. We have argued that in general they have to
be considered jointly: beside adding realism to the migration decision, they may have
opposing directions. Wealth constraints push towards positive self selection and a posi-
tive relation between immigration restrictions and migrant quality, incentives may push
towards the opposite. As we have seen, the latter e⁄ect depends on di⁄erential returns
to skills in sending vs. destination countries. Despite the relation between ￿w and ￿w￿
being often crucial for our predictions, we have not assumed any general pattern. We now
argue that a simple generalization is likely to be misleading.
On the theoretical side, with competitive labor markets, everything depends on the
production function one assumes for the two countries. The standard approach for aggre-
gate cross-country comparisons is to have output depending on some aggregate measure of
human capital. Skills are typically assumed to be perfectly substitutes, and the emphasis
goes on Total Factor Productivity, that is much higher in developed countries (see e.g.
Lucas (1990), Hall and Jones (1999), and the review in Caselli (2004)). Here, by construc-
tions, returns to skills increase with TFP and thus with GDP. Developed countries may
be more attractive for high skilled also due to skill complementarity (Kremer (1993)), or
skill biased technological di⁄erences (e.g. Acemoglu (1998), Caselli and Wilbur (2005)).
Other streams of literature instead argue that returns to skills are higher in developing
countries, emphasizing supply factors (skills are scarce in the South and abundant in the
North) or labor market institutions (e.g. unions, minimum wage) that compress returns
to skills in advanced economies (Blau and Kahn (1996) and Leuven, Oosterbeek and van
Ophem (2004)).
Going to the data, as a ￿rst approximation, one can look at wage gaps conditional on
skills. Strictly speaking, we are modeling migration given skills rather than the decision
28By the same reasoning in countries where low skilled natives had less power we should have observed
higher immigration ￿ ows (see the United States vs. the European Union) and lower quality of immigrants
(see the United States vs. Canada and Australia).
21to acquire skills, hence wage di⁄erentials rather than Mincerian returns (the coe¢ cient of
schooling in a log-wage regression) would be more appropriated in our setting. The stan-
dard generalization is that returns to skills decrease with per capita GDP (Psacharopoulos
and Patrinos (2002), Bils and Klenow (2000), Caselli and Wilbur (2005)), and also the
data on wages in Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) report such a decreasing relation. In
addition, they show that cross-country variation in wages slightly decreases with skills.
This would imply that real gains from migration tend to be higher for low skilled, but
these di⁄erences are not huge, and general patterns appear weak.29
A second dimensions, equally important, concerns the mapping from skills to jobs.
Immigrants do not necessarily have access to the whole spectrum of jobs and wages within
the receiving country, hence the wage gap per se may not be (fully) informative (see
below). This consideration complicates considerably the issue of cross country returns to
skills, as variables like skill transferability, labor market segmentation and other "barriers
to entry" are not easily measurable and comparable.30
In the immigration literature, accordingly, there is no consensus. As already men-
tioned (Section 1.1) some models assume that a worker with skill s in country j gets paid
w(s) = kj ￿ s hence, by construction, gains from South-North migration increases with
skills (Chiswick (1999), Giannetti (2003), Jasso and Rosenzweig (2005)). In our under-
standing, this formalization appears more suitable to describe self-selection in terms of
unobservables (e.g. ability) conditional on observable skills (e.g. education). In a sense,
it bypasses the issue of skill premia, without considering that low skilled may have the
greatest incentives to migrate, hence excluding a priori negative self-selection. The latter
possibility has been instead emphasized by a number of studies, following Borjas (1987),
which proxy returns to skills with (wage) inequality within the country (e.g. Hatton
and Williamson (2004)), while abstracting from the actual jobs immigrants tends to be
employed in.
A sensible way out of this comes from detailed micro analysis. Chiquiar and Hanson
(2005), for example, look at earnings by skills of Mexican resident vs. Mexican immigrants
(rather than Mexican resident vs. US residents) and, building counterfactual wages, they
estimate that real wage premia decrease, in absolute terms, with education.31 Similar esti-
mates can be found in the analysis of Palestinians immigrants to Israel (Yashiv (2004)).32
29Banerjee and Du￿ o (2004) argue that the common wisdom that returns to skills are higher in devel-
oping country is an artifact of low quality data.
30See for example the discussion in Hassler, Rodr￿guez Mora and Zeira (2003) on cross-country in-
equality and social mobility and Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (2000) on meritocracy and growth. An
interesting aspect here is the relation between returns to skills and growth opportunities, as opposed to
GDP levels in the standard empirical literature quoted above.
31They report that "real U.S. wage premium is $4.07 per hour for an individual with 5-8 years of
schooling, $3.52 for an individual with 12 years of education, and $2.60 for an individual with 16 or more
years of education".
32This study documents negative selection on observable skills (that is what we have modeled) and,
conditional on this, positive selection in term on unobservables. It gives support to the idea that un-
22They con￿rm our general point that self selection is in general driven both by di⁄er-
ential incentives and di⁄erential possibility to migrate: those who can access migration
are not necessarily those who have more to gain from it.
4.1.1 Discrimination
We have just argued that understanding cross country returns to skills requires, in our
setting, looking at some measure of "meritocracy" (or, in a dynamic setting, social mo-
bility) together with wage dispersion. It matters for example whether in a given country
personal connections or skills are the key to access well paid jobs. In other words, an high
wage gap does not necessarily imply that high skilled are those with highest gains from
migration, if immigrants have low chances to get well paid jobs:33
For a series of reasons, there are instances where most immigrants are locked into
traditional low skilled occupations (see e.g. Munshi (2003)), while the standard literature
on self-selection typically avoids any distinction between wages for natives and immigrants
in the host country. Even if convenient, the assumptions that these two groups are perfect
substitutes and that immigrants are given the same opportunities to access well paid jobs
are clearly problematic. It is not di¢ cult for example to observe high skilled immigrants
ending up with low skilled occupations. If good jobs are harder to get for immigrants,
incentives induce negative self-selection. This also implies that labor market competition
is hurting only low skilled natives, who then fear immigration even more.
One way to see this is to assume that barriers to entry are more severe for well paid
jobs, hence high skilled immigrants are (partially) prevented the access to them. This
may come from immigrants inability to assimilate (language, country-speci￿c skills) or
from a discriminatory labor market.34 In our model, we can introduce a measure of the
relation between immigrants￿skill and wages or, equivalently, a probability for an high
type immigrant to get wH. Denoting this measure with ￿ 2 [0;1]; type H immigrants
(expect to) earn wL + ￿￿w; where ￿ = 0 corresponds to full discrimination and ￿ = 1 to
observable skills are multidimensional and, given that di⁄erent skills are valued di⁄erently in di⁄erent
tasks, the selection into occupation may be non-hierarchical.
33To see this, assume that in the sending country high skilled have probability p￿
H to get a good job
(and 1 ￿ p￿
H to get a bad one). So their expected wage is E(w￿
H) = p￿
Hw￿
H + (1 ￿ p￿
H)w￿
L. In the same
way, low skilled expect E(w￿
L) = p￿
Lw￿




L and the country is considered
meritocratic the more p￿
H ! 1 and p￿
L ! 0: Similarly for the destination country. Now the requirement
that returns to skills are higher in the receiving country means E(wH) ￿ E(wL) > E(w￿
H) ￿ E(w￿
L); i.e.
(pH ￿ pL)￿w > (p￿
H ￿ p￿
L)￿w￿: For example, given that in Mexico we wage inequality is higher but
social mobility is lower than in the US (as reported by Dahan and Gaviria (2001)), i.e. ￿w < ￿w￿ but
(pH ￿ pL) > (p￿
H ￿ p￿
L); who should be more likely to migrate?
34These e⁄ects, to my knowledge, have not been explored in a formal model before (as recognized by
Borjas (1994), footnote 30). Moreover discrimination can be thought partly as a policy variable (e.g. anti
discrimination laws, recognition of foreign quali￿cations...), thus one may replicate in this setting what
we have just done with migration costs.
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nL + xL + (1 ￿ ￿)xH
Consider ￿ = 0; i.e. immigrants are treated as an homogeneous group of low skilled and
there is no opportunity for them to access good jobs. High skilled foreigners have now
less incentive to migrate and the quality of migrants decreases. Moreover discrimination
creates a negative spill-over on the low skilled market. Thus it is bad news for all foreigners
and migration ￿ ows also decrease.
High skilled natives thus always gain from immigration, since immigrants are prevented
to compete with them; while low skilled natives bear all the costs. Thus the former group
is greatly in favor of immigration while the latter strongly opposes it.
Proposition 5 Discrimination reduces size and quality of immigration and reinforces the
positive correlation between natives skills and "pro-immigration" attitudes.
4.2 Migration costs and immigration policies
Taken literally, our model makes some important simpli￿cations. Migration costs are
essentially money, and immigration restrictions only act on costs, unconditionally on
type. These assumptions are obviously not realistic, and we now discuss to what extent
other elements can be incorporated without a⁄ecting the basic logic of the analysis.
What migrants have to forsake is de￿nitely not only money, and it is not even obvious
that these are always the most signi￿cant component of migration costs. An important
stream of literature has emphasized that migration cannot be fully understood at the
level of the single individual. Family ties matters (e.g. Mincer (1978)), and other net-
work e⁄ects may be a major determinant of the migration decision (e.g. Massey, Arango,
Hugo, Kouaouci, Pellegrino and Taylor (1993)). The access to networks of previous mi-
grants may considerably facilitate migration by decreasing its costs (e.g. Carrington,
Detragiache and Vishwanath (1996), McKenzie and Rapoport (2005)) or increasing its
bene￿ts (e.g. Munshi (2003)). As long as we restrict to costs and bene￿ts, enlarging the
picture may not add explanatory power to the mechanisms already considered. However,
networks introduce a series of other dimensions which can drive migration (or the lack
of it) without directly being monetary costs or wage di⁄erentials. Consider for example
insurance motives. These are typically more salient for low skilled, hence they are poten-
tially very important for understanding self-selection. Nonetheless, it is not clear whether
abstracting from them may be a serious bias for our reasonings. Some literature considers
24these motives to explain positive self-selection: low skilled cannot migrate and give up
the support of their family or community, in terms of access to credit (e.g. Banerjee and
Newman (1998) and Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005)) or unemployment insurance (e.g.
Cuecuecha (2005)). Another stream of literature uses similar arguments to support neg-
ative self-selection: since low skilled cannot get formal insurance at home, migration and
remittances are a way for them to smooth family consumption (e.g. Stark and Bloom
(1985); Taylor (1986)). Hence, at this level of generality, the strength and direction of the
bias is ambiguous. The lack of explicit formalization of network e⁄ects, and possibly their
inclusion in the individual speci￿c component "i, does not appear such a fundamental
limitation for our purposes.
In the real world, also the policy space is de￿nitely more multifaceted. Receiving
countries can act on many dimensions rather than only on ￿, and they can do so by
trying to impose di⁄erent restrictions on di⁄erent type of immigrants. Of course, if the
receiving country could perfectly contract on immigrant skills and enforce restrictions
conditional on them, it would directly select the desired size and type of immigration and
our analysis would be (almost) pointless. However, as discussed further below, this does
not seem to be the case and, in such an imperfect world, our formalization may be of some
use. In fact, on the one hand, it is a way to highlight that even a policy independent on
type has some screening power. On the other, it may be a starting point to complicate the
policy space. For example, one can consider direct screening mechanisms. Even if skills
are not observable, a country could o⁄er di⁄erent types of entry permits, i.e. visa at price
￿￿ allowing employment only in type ￿ jobs. Beside the issue of enforcement, incentive
compatibility requires ￿L ￿ ￿H; otherwise low skilled would pretend to be high skilled,
enter and at worst get a low skilled job. Hence, this mechanisms is viable only if one
need to encourage low skilled migration. Alternatively, one can think of indirect ways to
a⁄ect immigrant quality. For example, a country o⁄ering generous welfare bene￿ts may
attract lower skilled immigrants (as this can be seen as a decrease in returns to skills) or,
as considered below, a country o⁄ering entry visa for an high fee and no bureaucracies is
likely to attract a pretty di⁄erent type of applicants than a country asking for no fees but
imposing a lot of red tapes.
4.2.1 Time and money
Migration costs include also the time immigrants have to spend in ￿lling out forms and
waiting for documents, and this may represent a relevant monetary entry in terms of
foregone earnings. What may change our previous analysis is that the value of time
also di⁄ers according to skills, e.g. high skilled may value their time more. To keep
the analysis simple, assume that each migrant has to invest the same amount of time in
bureaucracies, and this time is worth ￿w￿
￿: Hence, in absolute terms, bureaucracies ￿ are








L) + (￿w ￿ ￿w￿) ￿ (￿ + ￿w￿
H)]
￿[wL ￿ w￿
L ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿w￿
L]
Notice ￿rst that bureaucracies matters to the extent that incentives matter. As it seems
intuitive, time a⁄ects constraints equally across immigrants. Then we can see that the
conditions for positive self-selection become harder to satisfy. When only incentives mat-
ter, we would now need ￿w > (1+￿)￿w￿; i.e. di⁄erential returns to skill in the receiving
country are su¢ ciently high to compensate also for the loss of time, that increases with
￿￿w￿:












L) ￿ 0 (20)
Once again, without any further assumption, the sign is ambiguous. Roughly, we need the
relative gain to be larger for high skilled than for low skilled (while in the basic framework
we had the same condition with absolute gains).36 With respect to increasing the cost ￿;
however, we can clearly say that increasing bureaucracies is more likely to reduce migrant
quality. Now it is necessary but no more su¢ cient that migrants are positively self-selected
in terms of incentives for having a positive relation between cost and quality.
4.3 Immigration policy preferences
The analysis of preferences in receiving countries has assumed fully rational agents who
care only about their wages. The "fully rational" approach may be questioned: given that
immigration policies do not change so often, and when they do, it is typically very hard to
distinguish their e⁄ect from other concurrent factors, people may not be able to account
for the somewhat subtle "quality e⁄ect" and learn what is the optimal policy for them.
We have already discussed some arguments of the huge debate between economic vs.
non-economic motivations (Section 1.1), and, while probably of particular relevance here,
these objections are by no means limited to the literature on immigration preferences. A
more speci￿c concern is whether the labor market e⁄ect is the central element to explain
the relation between individual characteristics and preferences over immigration. Our
approach is in line with recent studies like Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2004),
35One could think that skills also a⁄ect e¢ ciency in complying with bureucracy: if the value of foregone
earning would then be smaller for high skilled, the analysis in the previous sections would apply (see
Chiswick (1999)).











relative gains increase with skills.
26O￿ Rourke and Sinnott (2004), reporting that once one restricts the sample to people out
of the labor force, the correlation between education and pro-immigration preferences
disappears.37
Moreover, we have adopted a "partial equilibrium" approach in analyzing the e⁄ect
of immigration, abstracting from at least two other important issues: ￿scal policy and
political economy. On ￿scal policy, one may argue that high skilled immigrants are always
preferred since they pay higher taxes and probably receive less welfare bene￿ts. Hence,
this would lead high skilled natives trading o⁄ the reduction in wages and the bene￿t in
transfers in accepting high skilled immigrants.38 Not many empirical studies have looked
at how this may drive preferences, and again the issue is controversial.39 One answer may
come by looking at high skilled preferences in areas with high skilled immigration: these
should be more supportive towards immigration if the impact on public budget was the
major concern, and less supportive if instead labor market competition was the major
concern. The only study that has done this is, to my knowledge, Hanson et al. (2005b),
who documents that across U.S. states the latter happens, i.e. the labor market e⁄ect
seems to be of ￿rst order.
On political economy issues, we have not given immigrants any political power in the
receiving country. Giving them voting rights may change the analysis: for example high
skilled natives may want to avoid getting too many low skilled foreigners as this would
increase their wages, but also, modifying the political equilibrium, change the policies in
favor of low skilled people (like in Ortega (2005)). One concern, at least in this setting, is
whether immigrants would vote according to their skills, hence protecting their wages, or
they would remain "loyal to their roots" and oppose restrictions to immigration anyway.
Lowell, Bean and de la Garza (1986) and Goldin (1994) report that immigrants lobbied
and voted for pro-immigration policies and a number of survey studies (e.g. Espenshade
and Hempstead (1996) and Scheve and Slaughter (2001)) report that immigrant have
in general more favorable attitudes towards immigration, irrespective of their economic
condition. Thus it seems that accounting for this long run political economy e⁄ect would
actually strengthen the standard result, i.e. low skilled may oppose immigration even
more.
In conclusion, our focus on R appears useful. While probably not the only argument
of the utility function, there are a series of reasons (labor market, ￿scal policy, political
37A similar ￿nding was already in Jones and Lambert (1959). Still, the debate is very much open. For
example Hainmueller and Hiscox (2004) ￿nd the opposite result: high skilled natives are less opposed
to immigration irrespective of their economic conditions. Being part of the labor force is irrelevant,
education works through cultural values and beliefs.
38The simplest way to introduce ￿scal issues here is to think that the government collects tw￿ and
distributes the revenues with a lump sum transfer to every worker. Now high skilled utility is a convex
combination (with weight t) of w￿ (negatively dependent on R) and the transfer (that depends positively
on R).
39The ￿ndings by Mayda (2004) seem to suggest that this e⁄ect is actually negligible; the ones by
Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2005a) suggest the opposite.
27economy) why natives may care about the impact of immigration on the receiving country
skill ratio.
5 Conclusion
The paper has developed a simple and uni￿ed framework for analyzing the interaction
between self-selection and immigration policy determination. This approach has uncov-
ered some new and possibly important mechanisms shaping the migration decision, the
preferences over immigration policy in the receiving country and the corresponding "op-
timal" policy design. Our perspective has been positive and qualitative, and a number
of simpli￿cations and limitations have emerged. However, with a large set of caveat in
mind, one may draw some very tentative policy implications. A prime motivation for this
discussion is that the quality of immigrants matters: while the literature on the impact
of immigration is divided in almost any respect, a general consensus is that, considering
the e⁄ect both on the labor market and on ￿scal spending, high skilled immigrants create
net bene￿ts for host countries.40 Hence, improving the ability to screen would represent
a clear gain for receiving countries.
As we have shown, migrants￿self-selection implies that any policy, even if independent
on type, a⁄ects di⁄erent migrants in a di⁄erent way, i.e. it has some (indirect) screening
power. This can limit the e⁄ectiveness of the policy, but it may also be viewed as an
additional dimension to exploit. In fact, there are many instances where direct screening
mechanisms are di¢ cult to implement and not so powerful.41 An alternative route is then
to act on costs and in￿ uence the migration decision, a⁄ecting ex-ante self-selection rather
than imposing restrictions ex-post. In this respect, however, our model does not deliver
any simple and absolute policy prescription. Instead, things may change dramatically
according to whether migration is driven by wealth constraints or economic incentives,
and in general on the source country characteristics. If those who migrate are simply those
who can a⁄ord it, issues like labor market discrimination or red tapes may not have a
crucial e⁄ect on immigrants skill composition. Increasing the migration cost (e.g. through
a head tax on entry) is likely to increase migrant quality, thus it may be a viable way to
screen the migration ￿ ows.42 Instead, as economic incentives become the main argument
of the migration decision, the e⁄ect of these policies depends on di⁄erential returns to
40See e.g. Borjas (1995), Lee and Miller (2000), Storesletten (2000), Chojnicki, Docquier and Ragot
(2005), Chiswick (2005).
41See e.g. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1995) and Jasso, Rosenzweig and Smith (1998) on US immigrants,
Miller (1999) on the Australian point system, Antecol, Cobb-Clark and Trejo (2003) and Jasso and
Rosenzweig (2005) on Canada and Australia vs. the US.
42Of course one concern with this kind of measures is that they tend to encourage illegal immigration
(that is more attractive for low skilled). However the issue is common to any intervention (e.g. setting
quotas or entry requirements) directed to regulate legal migration and it reveals once again that restricting
entry cannot be the only dimension of a sound immigration policy.
28skills and thus it is in general more di¢ cult to predict. Discrimination and bureaucracies
push migrants towards negatively self-selection and in this case a more restrictive policy
is likely to lead to even less skilled immigration.
The most general conclusion of our exploration is that self-selection matters, also for
receiving countries. The forces shaping self-selection a⁄ect also the way di⁄erent potential
migrants respond to policy changes, which is obviously a central element to consider when
thinking about immigration policy. Nothing is terribly surprising in this statement. There
is a huge and fundamental literature explaining how di⁄erent agents respond di⁄erently
to a change in price.43 For some reason, the issue has been generally overlooked by the
literature on immigration policy, and, under this perspective, the paper may be a step
towards bridging the gap.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider F(H;L) = H￿L1￿￿, H = nH + xH = nH + H(wH;￿),
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Given constant returns to scale and perfect competition, there is no possibility of Pareto
improvements in our economy. Hence, @wH=@￿ ￿ 0 () @wL=@￿ ￿ 0: Moreover,













and since wL=wH = R(1 ￿ ￿)=￿; we write
@GH
@￿







hence @GH=@￿ ￿ 0 () @xH=@￿￿R@xL=@￿ ￿ 0 () (1￿L)@xH=@￿￿(1￿H)@xL=@￿ ￿
0 () @R=@￿ ￿ 0:
43These agents being borrowers dealing with interest rates, workers with wages or policyholders with
insurance premia (see e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981))
29Similarly for wL:
The relation between R and ￿. Examples. Recall that
R =
nH + (1 ￿ ￿H)￿("H)n￿
H
nL + (1 ￿ ￿L)￿("L)n￿
L
Hence, imposing condition (15), @R=@￿ ￿ 0 ,
f￿("
H)￿("







L)(1 ￿ ￿L)] ￿ [!H￿("
H) + ￿("
H)(1 ￿ ￿H)] ￿ 0 (21)
Suppose ￿rst that incentives do not depend on skills, i.e. ￿w = ￿w￿, hence ￿("H) =
￿("L) = ￿: In this case, a slightly positive correlation between wealth and skills is enough
to guarantee positive self-selection. The e⁄ect of cost on R is positive, i.e. the quality
e⁄ect is stronger, when
￿[￿H ￿ ￿L] + ￿[!L ￿ !H] + ￿
2[!L(1 ￿ ￿H) ￿ !H(1 ￿ ￿L)] > 0 (22)
Since [￿H ￿￿L] is negative, the size e⁄ect is stronger when ￿ is high, i.e. many potential
immigrants are almost indi⁄erent between moving or not. Now, increasing the cost con-
vinces a lot of them not to move. Since we have positive self-selection, these are typically
high skilled, hence R decreases. On the other hand, due to [!L(1￿￿H)￿!H(1￿￿L)] > 0;
the quality e⁄ect gets stronger as ￿ increases. When many foreigners are willing to mi-
grate, increasing the cost increases R because an higher cost does not a⁄ect much immi-
grants￿incentives, but it rather allows only the richest, and hence high skilled, to move.
Having higher incentives is most likely with low restrictions and, in addition, a "su¢ -
ciently low" ￿ ensures that [!L ￿ !H] is positive, that is necessary to have condition
(17).
The meaning of "su¢ ciently low" cost depends of course on the functional forms
one assumes. Suppose wealth is distributed according to !￿ = Weib(k￿;￿); that is a
Weibull with location parameters kL < kH and shape parameter ￿ > 1. This distribution






: To get a necessary condition for the quality e⁄ect to be relevant, like in (18),
consider the limiting case where foreigners are insensitive to incentives (perhaps because
the wage gap is so high that everybody would like to move). This may be thought as
a way to isolate a pure wealth e⁄ect, and it gives the quality e⁄ect its best chances to
prevail. In fact, now ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0; hence, the quality e⁄ect dominates as long as
!H=(2 ￿ ￿H) < !L=(2 ￿ ￿L). Given our wealth distribution, after some algebra, one can
see that as kL ! kH; we need ￿ < k￿
￿ p
1:28; i.e. the cost has to be small enough to allow




























and this holds for any ￿ < ￿max = k￿
￿ p
1:28, where the fraction of low skilled who can
a⁄ord to move is e￿1:28 ’ 0:28: The requirement gets milder the higher is
kH
kL, i.e. wealth
inequality strengthen self selection and thus the quality e⁄ect. If for example high skilled
foreigners are on average twice (respectively four times) as wealthy as low skilled, similar
computations show that we require that at least 10% (respectively 3%) of the low skilled
can incur the migration cost. That is, if e.g. kH = 2kL then ￿max = 1:52kL ; where
￿L(￿max) = 0:9 while if kH = 4kL then ￿max = 1:88kL ; where ￿L(￿max) = 0:97:
Hence, in this example, the quality e⁄ect dominates for any ￿ < ￿max and the size
e⁄ect dominates afterwards. Hence, the skill ratio R is maximum when ￿ = ￿max. In
terms of policy, this implies that high skilled natives will support a less restrictive policy
(despite immigrants being high skilled) if ￿ < ￿max and they will instead push for a more
restrictive one if ￿ > ￿max: Low skilled natives will of course have the opposite preferences.
Finally, ￿max would be the cost chosen by an utilitarian government solving the program
in (19) with ￿￿ = n￿.
As an alternative example, suppose that wealth distribution is independent on skills,
i.e. ￿H = ￿L = ￿: Consider the case ￿w ￿ ￿w￿ (the other one is symmetric). The










L)] > 0 (23)
The analysis follows the close correspondence with the one just developed, and it is meant
to show just that our reasonings are robust to having di⁄erent forces driving self-selection.
First, since [￿("L) ￿ ￿("H)] < 0; the power of the size e⁄ect increases with !: If the cost
is at the mode of !; many potential immigrants are at the margin between a⁄ording or
not the migration cost, hence, a slight increase in the cost makes migration impossible to
many of them. Given ￿w > ￿w￿, these are mostly high skilled, hence an increase in the
cost decreases R. On the other hand, since [￿("L)￿("H) ￿ ￿("H)￿("L)]; the power of the
quality e⁄ect increases with (1￿￿); that is with the amount of foreigners who can a⁄ord
to migrate. If this fraction is high, i.e. if the cost is relatively low, increasing cost does not
prevent many people but rather screens those with highest incentive. Given ￿w > ￿w￿,
these are the high skilled, hence R increases. Again as above, a low cost is in general
useful both for having (1 ￿ ￿) high and for having ￿ decreasing, i.e. ￿("L) ￿ ￿("H) > 0;
which is necessary to meet condition (17):
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